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We characterize equilibria with endogenous debt constraints for a general equilibrium economy with
limited commitment in which the only consequence of default is losing the ability to borrow in future
periods. First, we show that equilibrium debt limits must satisfy a simple condition that allows agents
to exactly roll over existing debt period by period. Second, we provide an equivalence result, whereby
the resulting set of equilibrium allocations with self-enforcing private debt is equivalent to the allocations
that are sustained with unbacked public debt or rational bubbles; for the latter, there exist well known
existence and characterization results. In contrast to the classic result by Bulow and Rogoff (AER
1989), positive levels of debt are sustainable in our environment because the interest rate is sufficiently
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This paper addresses the classic question whether debt can be sustained purely by a reputation
mechanism. Suppose that the only punishment imposed on a borrower who defaults on his oblig-
ations is that he will not be able to borrow again in the future. A seminal result in Bulow and
Rogoﬀ (1989a - henceforth BR) claims that, under this type of punishment, debt is unsustainable.
They analyze the case of a small open economy, borrowing at a given positive world interest rate.
In that environment, if the country ever borrows a positive amount, it will eventually reach a point
where it is strictly better oﬀ defaulting and ﬁnancing all future consumption with positive asset
positions, out of a ‘savings’ account.1
This result has sparked a rich literature on reputational mechanisms for sustaining debt. Some
of these contributions have augmented Bulow and Rogoﬀ’s (1989a) framework to sustain debt
by non-competitive mechanisms, such as reduction of trade, loss of trade credit, or other non-
ﬁnancial sanctions (Bulow and Rogoﬀ 1989b), collusion among non-competitive lenders (Kletzer
and Wright 2000, Wright 2001), loss of reputation in other dimensions (Cole and Kehoe 1998), time
inconsistency in the borrower’s preferences (Gul and Pesendorfer 2003, Amador 2003), or reduced
access to state-contingent securities (Pesendorfer 1992, Thomas 1992, Grossman and Han 1999). A
separate branch of the literature has studied markets with stronger consequences of default, such as
outright exclusion from markets into autarky (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981, Kehoe and Levine 1993,
and Kocherlakota 1996), or loss of productive collateral (Lustig 2004). One appealing feature of
this latter class of models is the endogenous determination of debt limits in general equilibrium, so
as to provide proper incentives to honor existing outstanding debt (Alvarez and Jermann 2000).
In this paper, we go back to the original Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989a) setup, but frame the problem
in a general equilibrium model with endogenous debt limits. We consider a symmetric environment
in which all agents have limited commitment, and default is punished only by the exclusion from
future borrowing. We show that positive amounts of debt are sustainable in equilibrium.
Key to our analysis is that, when all the agents have limited commitment, the equilibrium
interest rate adjusts endogenously so as to ensure that agents repay their debt. Reputational
1Related results appear in Chari and Kehoe (1993) and in Krueger and Uhlig (2005). Chari and Kehoe consider
government debt in a model with distortive taxes and lack of commitment by the government, but not the households.
Krueger and Uhlig analyze competitive risk-sharing contracts with one-sided commitment by the insurers, and show
that such contracts never allow the insured to incur debt. Both papers have in common with each other and with
BR the assumption of one-sided commitment and access to savings at competitive market rates after a default.
2incentives for debt repayments thus rely not only on the amount of credit to which agents have
access in future periods, but, perhaps more importantly, on the interest rate at which this credit is
made available.
Our main argument can be split in two steps. First, we show that incentives for default disappear
if the interest rate is suﬃcient low. Second, we show that interest rates low enough to be consistent
with repayment can emerge in equilibrium in an economy where no agent can commit to repay.
To illustrate these results, we ﬁrst present a simple deterministic example where positive bor-
rowing is sustained in equilibrium. In the example, private debt is self-enforcing as long as the
equilibrium interest rate is smaller than or equal to the growth rate of debt limits, which equals
the growth rate of aggregate endowments in steady-state. In the rest of the paper, we give a full
characterization of the conditions under which private debt is sustainable.
For the general analysis, we consider a stochastic endowment economy with sequential trade
in complete contingent securities markets. Agents may issue securities up to a state-contingent
limit. If they default, they are denied credit in all future periods. The equilibrium debt limits are
determined endogenously as the largest possible limits such that repayment is always individually
rational. Our ﬁrst general result (Theorem 1) states that debt limits are self-enforcing if and only
if they allow all individuals to exactly ﬁnance outstanding obligations by issuing new claims. In a
deterministic environment, this is satisﬁed if and only if they grow at a rate equal to or larger than
the real rate of interest.
Our second main result (Theorem 2) establishes conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
with self-enforcing debt and gives a characterization of sustainable equilibrium allocations, by means
of an equivalence result. Consider an alternative environment with no private debt, but where we
allow a government to issue state-contingent debt that is not backed by any ﬁscal revenue, i.e.,
where the government must ﬁnance all existing claims by issuing new debt. This unbacked public
debt has the feature of a rational bubble (Tirole 1982); in a deterministic environment, it can
be reinterpreted as ﬁat money. We show that any equilibrium allocation of the economy with
self-enforcing private debt can also be sustained as an equilibrium allocation of the economy with
unbacked public debt, and vice versa. Since there exist well known conditions for the sustainability
of positive levels of unbacked public debt, or the existence of rational bubbles or ﬁat money more
generally (see Santos and Woodford 1997 for a general analysis), these conditions also characterize
the sustainability of positive levels of private debt in a general equilibrium Bulow-Rogoﬀ economy.
Related Literature: First and foremost, our paper presents an answer to the theoretical puzzle
3posed by the no-lending result of BR. Contrary to much of the literature that sought to overturn
this result, we show that stronger enforcement power such as complete market exclusion, collateral,
or other non-competitive mechanisms, is not necessary to sustain debt, once interest rates can
adjust to account for the common lack of commitment.2 A key assumption in BR is that the net
present value of a borrower’s life-time endowments, when discounted at market prices, is ﬁnite, and
that this life-time endowment value gives an upper bound for the borrower’s outstanding debt. In
our model, endowments and consumption allocations are no longer ﬁnite valued at the resulting
equilibrium prices. In light of this result, BR’s partial equilibrium assumption seems unwarranted,
since it exactly rules out the debt contracts that emerge endogenously in equilibrium.3
Our paper also builds on the literature on endogenous debt constraints (Kehoe and Levine 1993,
Alvarez and Jermann 2000) by developing a similar theory in a model in which borrowers face future
denial of credit as the only consequence of a default. It further draws a connection between models
of endogenous debt limits and rational asset pricing bubbles (Tirole 1982). That rational bubbles
may exist in models with borrowing constraints àl aBewley (1980) was recognized in Scheinkman
and Weiss (1986), Kocherlakota (1992) and Santos and Woodford (1997). By establishing an
equivalence result between trade in self-enforcing private debt in a Bulow-Rogoﬀ environment and
a speciﬁc form of a rational bubble (i.e., as unbacked public debt), we exploit existing results on the
sustainability of such bubbles to arrive at a characterization of when private debt is sustainable.
In fact, one interpretation of our equivalence result is that rational bubbles can be competitively
supplied by the market, in the form of circulating private debt.
Finally, our results have implications for applications of intertemporal general equilibrium mod-
els to sovereign debt and international capital ﬂows, risk-sharing and consumption smoothing or
to monetary theory, among others. We defer a detailed discussion of these applications and other
extensions to Section 5, after we have established our main results.
In Section 2, we describe our general model and deﬁne competitive equilibria with self-enforcing
private debt and unbacked public debt. In Section 3, we illustrate our main results in a simple
deterministic example. In Section 4, we establish our two main theorems, and discuss the intuition
2The idea that debt is sustainable once all agents have limited commitment also appears in Cole and Kehoe (1995).
However, they consider a game-theoretic environment in which interest rates are exogenous, and debt is sustained
by means of a trigger-strategy equilibrium, in which agents revert to a no-lending equilibrium after a default by any
market participant.
3In the working-paper version of their paper, Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1988, p. 5) remark that this assumption rules out
“‘Ponzi’-type reputational contracts.” These are precisely the type of contracts that emerge in general equilibrium.
Mohr (1991) derives a similar Ponzi-type condition in a two-period overlapping generations model.
4behind our characterization of self-enforcing debt constraints. Section 5 discusses extensions and
applications of our results. Proofs omitted from the text are in the appendix.
2 The Model
Uncertainty: Consider a discrete-time, inﬁnite-horizon endowment economy. At each date t ∈
{0,1,2,...}, there exists a ﬁnite set St of publicly observable events st, which are partially ordered
into an event tree S. Each event st has a unique predecessor σ
¡
st¢
∈ St−1, and is followed by
ap o s i t i v e ,ﬁnite number of events st+1 ∈ St+1,s . t . st = σ
¡
st+1¢
. There exists a unique initial
event dated by t =0and denoted s0. Event st+τ is said to follow event st (denoted st+τ Â st)i f
σ(τ) ¡
st+τ¢





st+τ : st+τ Â stª
denotes the set of all events that follow st.








for all t.A td a t e0,n a t u r ed r a w ss∞ ∈ S∞. At each date t>0, st is publicly revealed
to all agents. We let π
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st¢














conditional probability of st+τ,g i v e nst.
Preferences and endowments: At each event st, there is a single non-storable consumption
good. There is a ﬁnite number J of consumer types, each represented by a unit measure of
agents, and indexed by j. Each consumer type is characterized by a sequence of endowments






















where β ∈ (0,1) and u(·) is strictly increasing, convex, and bounded above.
Self-enforcing private debt: At each history st, agents may issue contingent claims, which
promise to pay one unit of consumption in period t+1, contingent on the occurrence of event st+1 Â
st, in exchange for current consumption goods. These claims are traded in complete sequential
Walrasian markets. If the promises are always fulﬁlled (as they will be in equilibrium), individual
promises issued by diﬀerent agents are perfect substitutes and are equivalent to a state-contingent
one-period bond. Denote by q
¡
st+1|st¢
the price of such a bond at event st, or, equivalently, the




=1 ,w el e tp
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, for all st ∈ S.
5An agent’s asset proﬁle is deﬁned as a function aj : S →R,w h e r eaj ¡
st¢
denotes the net
ﬁnancial position at st of an agent of type j, that is, the amount of promises due to him in st,n e t




If the agent does not default, his consumption at st, denoted cj ¡
st¢


















If agents had the ability to fully commit to their promises, they would be able to smooth
all type-speciﬁc endowment ﬂuctuations. In our model, agents lack this type of commitment: at
any date st, agents can simply refuse to honor their past promises and default. Agents will then
fulﬁll their obligations only if it is in their best interest to do so, and the incentives for repayment
depend on the consequences of default. We assume that, if an agent defaults, this fact becomes
common knowledge and the agent looses the ability to issue claims in all future periods. Creditors
can seize any ﬁnancial assets he might hold at the moment of default (i.e., his holdings of other




st+τ∈S(st)∪{st}, nor are they able to seize the ﬁnancial claims he will accumulate in future
periods. In summary, after a default, an agent retains his ability to purchase claims but he looses
his privilege to issue claims, and he starts with a net ﬁnancial position of 0.4
The amount of claims that an agent issues are publicly observable. To provide repayment
incentives, at each event st, each agent faces an upper bound −φj ¡
st+1¢
o nt h ea m o u n to fc l a i m s






on his net ﬁnancial position at st+1. These debt limits are endogenously determined to make the
debt self-enforcing, i.e., to give the agents the right repayment incentives. Formally, the sequence of









,t h e na tst he is exactly indiﬀerent between repayment and default. If an agent’s
net ﬁnancial position were to fall below φj ¡
st¢
at st, the agent would have an incentive to default
on his promises, whereas if his net asset position remains above φj ¡
st¢
, he prefers to repay rather
than default. In equilibrium, all other market participants anticipate this, and are hence willing to
4The assumption that any positive holdings of other agents’ claims are conﬁscated in case of default is made only
for analytic and expositional purposes; it implies that agents can default only on their net ﬁnancial position. We will
discuss later how it can be relaxed; it turns out to have no impact on our results. Therefore, the only disciplining
element that may prevent agents from defaulting is losing the privilege to borrow in future periods.
6extend credit up to the point where the agent’s net ﬁnancial position reaches φj ¡
st¢
, thus allowing
the agent to borrow any amount that he can credibly commit to repay.
Equilibrium deﬁnition: For each type j, and history st,l e tV j(a,Φj ¡
st¢
;st) denote the






st+τ∈S(st), and never defaults. V j(a,Φj ¡
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st+τ+1Âst+τ satisfy the budget
constraint (2), the borrowing constraint (3) and cj ¡
st+τ¢
≥ 0, with given aj ¡
st¢
= a.
Likewise, let Dj ¡
a;st¢
denote the life-time utility of a consumer who has defaulted in the
past and hence has to hold a non-negative ﬁnancial position at all future periods. For any a ≥
0, Dj ¡
a;st¢













st+τ+1Âst+τ satisfy the budget constraint (2), the borrowing
constraint aj ¡
st+τ+1¢
≥ 0,a n dcj ¡
st+τ¢
≥ 0,w i t hg i v e naj ¡
st¢






;st),w h e r eO
¡
st¢
stands for the sequence of borrowing constraints equal to zero at
every continuation history of st.
V j(a,Φj ¡
st¢
;st) and Dj ¡
a;st¢
are both strictly increasing in a. Since, by assumption, an
agent who defaults starts from a net asset position of 0, an agent with net asset position a will
ﬁnd it optimal not to default whenever V j(a,Φj ¡
st¢
;st) ≥ Dj ¡
0;st¢
.W et h u sh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g
deﬁnition of self-enforcement:







for all st ∈ S. (5)
This leads to the following deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing private
debt:
Deﬁnition 2 A competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing private debt {Cj,a j,Φj;p}j=1,...,J is
deﬁned by a sequence of consumption allocations Cj : S →R+ and net ﬁnancial positions aj : S →R
for each consumer type j, a sequence of debt limits Φj : S →R− for each consumer type, and a
price sequence p : S →R+, for which:
(i) Optimality: for each j, Cj and aj solve (P1) at s0, given initial asset holdings aj ¡
s0¢
=0 .













=0for all st ∈ S.
This equilibrium deﬁnition follows Alvarez and Jermann (2000) in that debt limits must be self-
enforcing, i.e., not give agents any incentive to default, but departs from them by assuming denial of
future credit instead of complete autarky as the consequence of a default. From the perspective of
the individual, the debt limits are treated much like prices in Walrasian markets in that individuals
optimize taking prices and debt limits as given, and these adjust to satify market-clearing and
self-enforcement.
Furthermore, our deﬁnition of self-enforcement implies that debt limits adjust in equilibrium to
allow for the maximum amount of credit. This is akin to Alvarez and Jermann’s (2000) notion of












;st) >D j ¡
0;st¢
, an agent facing a binding debt limit at φj ¡
st¢
would be will-
ing to borrow at a rate slightly higher than the market interest rate and market participants would
not be willing to refuse him credit. Our debt limits are thus set so that (i) no borrower has an
incentive to default, (ii) no lender has an incentive to extend credit beyond a borrower’s debt limit,
and (iii) no lender has an incentive to refuse credit to a borrower below the borrower’s debt limit.
Unbacked public debt: Finally, for our equivalence result, we consider an alternative economy,
in which agents are not allowed to borrow, but can smooth consumption using government-issued
securities that are not backed by taxation, i.e., the government must issue new securities to honor
current outstanding claims.




which are traded in complete sequential Walrasian markets. However, unlike before, the agents can
no longer issue these claims themselves; instead they are provided by a government, which rolls over
a ﬁxed initial stock of claims d
¡
s0¢
period by period by issuing new securities. The government’s











, i.e., that the amount
of resources raised by issuing new claims for st+1 at history st is suﬃcient to honor the previous
period’s commitments. We focus on environments where in each period, the government’s roll-over














for all st ∈ S.( 6 )
Let dj ¡
s0¢








8For a given sequence of prices, the consumers’ problem is then deﬁned as above by (P1), with
debt limits characterized by O
¡
s0¢
. Thus, a competitive equilibrium with unbacked public debt is
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 A competitive equilibrium {Cj,ˆ aj,d j ¡
s0¢
;D,p}j=1,...,J with unbacked public debt is
deﬁned by a sequence of consumption allocations Cj : S →R+ and net ﬁnancial positions aj :
S →R+ for each consumer type j, an initial debt allocation dj ¡
s0¢
for each consumer type, a price
sequence p : S →R+,a n das e q u e n c eo fd e b tc i r c u l a t i o n sD : S →R+,f o rw h i c h :
























for all st ∈ S.
(iii) Government Budget constraint: (6) is satisﬁed for all st ∈ S.
3A S i m p l e E x a m p l e
In this section, we illustrate the main results of our paper by means of a simple deterministic
example with alternating endowments.5 There are two types of consumers, odd and even, which
are characterized by diﬀerent endowment proﬁles: Odd consumers receive the endowment {yo
t} =
{θ0e,θ1e,θ2e,...} a n de v e nc o n s u m e r st h ee n d o w m e n t{ye
t} = {θ0e,θ1e,θ2e,...}. The consumers
have identical preferences over consumption sequences {ct}, represented by the utility function
P∞
t=0 βt logct. The productivity parameter θt = gt grows exogenously at a rate g>0,a n dw e
assume that βe>e , which implies that endowment ﬂuctuations are suﬃciently large.
In the absence of enforcement frictions, the market equilibrium of this economy achieves a
Pareto-optimal allocation in which the consumption of all consumers grows at the rate g and the
one-period bond price is given by β/g. This setup goes back at least to Townsend (1980) and is
analyzed in detail by Woodford (1990) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, Chap. 18) as an example
of an economy where private or public debt instruments are traded to smooth idiosyncratic income
ﬂuctuations.
Steady states with self-enforcing private debt: Suppose now that agents trade self-
enforcing private debt to smooth endowment ﬂuctuations. Since the environment is deterministic,
they simply trade non-contingent debt. To derive the steady-state equilibria, we conjecture (and
verify) that individual debt limits for each type grow at a constant rate g, i.e., they take the form
5To simplify notation, we replace the dependence on histories s
t by the time subscript t.
9φ
j
t = φjgt for j ∈ {o,e} with φj ≤ 0. Furthermore, we conjecture that the steady-state bond price
is qo in periods when odd types have high endowments, and qe i np e r i o d sw h e ne v e nt y p e sh a v e
high endowments. Finally, we conjecture that the equilibrium bond prices are greater or equal than
their frictionless level, i.e., qo,q e ≥ β/g.
Consider ﬁrst the behavior of a non-defaulting agent. Given our conjecture on prices and debt
limits, Lemma 1 derives optimal consumption and asset holdings that solve (P1) at date t,w i t h
initial asset holdings at = φj.



















βe − (qjg)e + φj (β +( qog)(qeg))
¤
. (9)
Consider a consumer of type j, who has a high endowment in period t and has net assets at = φj.
Suppose aj ≥ φj. If the consumer never defaults on or after date t, his optimal consumption is
cjgt+τ in high endowment periods and cjgt+τ in low endowment periods. Optimal asset holdings
are ajgt+τ in low endowment periods and −φjgt+τ in high endowment periods.
To ﬁnd a steady-state equilibrium, we impose market-clearing in the asset market:
−φ−j = aj, (10)
for j ∈ {o,e}. For given values of φo and φe, we can substitute (9) in (10) and obtain two equations
which give us the equilibrium prices qo and qe. Market clearing in the goods markets follows by
Walras’ Law. Using (10), we also have aj ≥ 0, which guarantees that the debt limit condition
aj ≥ φj in Lemma 1 is satisﬁed, and that it is never optimal to default in low-endowment periods.
It remains to be determined under what conditions the debt limits φo and φe are self-enforcing.
Lemma 2 determines optimal consumption allocations and asset holdings for an agent who defaults
in the high endowment period.
















10Consider a consumer of type j, who has a high endowment in period t. If the consumer defaults his
optimal consumption after default is cd
jgt+τ in high endowment periods and cd
jgt+τ in low endowment
periods. Optimal asset holdings are ad
jgt in low endowment periods, and 0 in high endowment
periods.
If an agent defaults, his initial asset position after default is 0. From then on, the agent’s
optimal consumption path alternates between cd
j and cd
j. If he does not default, his consumption
alternates between cj and cj. By comparing (7)-(8) with (11)-(12), it immediately follows that
agents prefer no-default as long as either (qog)(qeg) ≥ 1 or φj =0 . Since we are interested in
equilibria with positive amounts of borrowing, i.e., non autarkic equilibria, let us focus on the case
φj < 0. Moreover, agents are exactly indiﬀerent between default and no-default if and only if
(qog)(qeg)=1 . (13)
Since we seek to determine φo and φe in such a way that, whenever the agents are debt con-
strained, they are also indiﬀerent between repayment and default, we impose (13) as an equilibrium
condition. Going back to the asset market clearing condition, we ﬁnd
−φj − φ−j =
1/(qjg)
1+β
[βe − (qjg)e], (14)
for j ∈ {o,e}. Therefore, in an equilibrium with self-enforcing private debt, the bond price qj has
to be the same in odd and even periods, and, by condition (13), has to be equal to qo = qe =1 /g.
Substituting this into equation (14), we then ﬁnd the values for the debt limits φo and φe compatible
with a self-enforcing equilibrium. The assumption that βe>eguarantees that both limits can be set
at values smaller or equal than zero. However, apart from this restriction, any pair of φo,φ e which
satisﬁes (14) is compatible with self-enforcement. These results are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Whenever βe>e , there exists a non-autarkic steady-state equilibrium with self-
enforcing private debt, in which qog = qeg =1 . Borrowing constraints adjust so that
φo + φe = −
1
1+β
[βe − e], (15)
and are otherwise indeterminate. Consumption allocations are determinate and are given by c =
1
1+β [e + e] in high endowment periods and c =
β
1+β [e + e] in low endowment periods. In addition,
there always exists an autarkic equilibrium, in which φo = φe =0 , c = e, c = e,a n dqe,q o ≥
βe
ge.
11This characterization illustrates the main point of our paper. Contrary to the zero-borrowing
result of BR, who consider a small open economy borrowing at given world interest rates, the
general equilibrium environment considered here leads to positive levels of borrowing and lending.
This is sustained in equilibrium by an interest rate equal to the growth rate of the economy’s
endowment. As debt limits grow at the same rate as the economy, this interest rate ensures that
the incentives for repayment are satisﬁed and debt is sustainable.6
This general equilibrium result derives from the observation that an agent’s repayment incentives
depend not only on whether an agent is allowed to borrow or lend in the future, but also on the
the interest rate at which borrowing and lending will take place. The higher the interest rate, the
less appealing is the opportunity to borrow in the future, and the more appealing the option to be
a net lender after default.
Self-enforcement imposes an upper bound on the interest rate, so as to reduce the returns to
savings in case of a default, and to reduce the cost of borrowing. In steady-state, this upper
bound exactly pins down the interest rate as equal to the steady-state growth rate. Debt limits
then adjust to make sure that this interest rate clears the market. This contrasts with a partial
equilibrium approach which takes interest rates as given and seeks to ﬁnd sustainable debt limits.
This would require the debt limits to grow at the given real rate of interest. With positive interest
rates, the agents’ debt limits would then eventually exceed the present value of their life-time future
endowments, which would be inconsistent with market clearing in general equilibrium. This is why,
under the assumptions of BR, our form of self-enforcing debt could not arise.






. Consider a borrower
who is constrained in periods t and t +2 . In a steady state with self-enforcing borrowing, this
borrower could just roll-over his current debt between periods t and t +2 . This roll-over does not
require any real resources from consumer j, since he can repay φjgt by issuing φjgt+1 at the price
qt = g−1, and then repay φjgt+1 by issuing φjgt+2 in the same manner. This exact roll-over is not
necessarily optimal for the consumer. In fact, in the example considered it is not optimal along
the equilibrium path. However, the fact that this roll-over is feasible turns out to be an essential
property of self-enforcing borrowing limits, as we will show in the next section.7
6In our environment, the consumers’ transversality condition limt→∞ β
tu
0(ct)at =0does not imply the “no
bubble” condition limt→∞ ptat =0 . As discussed in Kocherlakota (1992) and in Santos and Woodford (1997), in the
presence of borrowing constraints the former can hold independently of the latter because the Euler equation does
not hold at all points in time as an equality.
7Although our discussion above has not explicitly considered default incentives for periods in which the debt limit
is not binding, our characterization of debt limits is valid in those periods as well. This can be shown either by
12Finally, note that the equilibrium determines the aggregate amount of debt φo+φe, but not how
these borrowing privileges are split between the two types. Steady-state consumption allocations do
not depend on this distribution of borrowing privileges. In our model, the ability to borrow is a form
of private seignorage, which acts like a wealth transfer to the borrower and raises his consumption
in all periods. The sign and magnitude of this rent are directly proportional to (qog)(qeg) − 1.I n
equilibrium, competition amongst borrowers eliminates this rent, and drives interest rates up to
the point, where (qog)(qeg)=1 . At this point the wealth transfer associated with the access to
credit is zero, so that steady-state consumption allocations are independent of an agent’s allowed
debt limit. As we will see below, this indeterminacy in the allocation of borrowing limits also holds
more generally.8
Equivalence with ﬁat money economy: The equilibrium allocations characterized above
have the property that steady-state interest rates must equal the steady state growth rate, qg =1 .
This is not a coincidence. As is well known, the same steady-state property arises in models in
which agents only trade a ﬁxed supply of ﬁat money. To formalize this, consider the alternative
environment described above (p. 8), with no borrowing and with unbacked public debt. With
deterministic endowments, unbacked public debt is identical to a ﬁxed supply of ﬁat money.9 Let
the ﬁxed money stock be denoted by M.L e t Qt denote the period-t price of money in terms of
consumption goods, and 1/qt = Qt+1/Qt the real return on holding one unit of money from t to
t +1 . Proposition 2 characterizes steady-state equilibria of the economy with ﬁat money.
Proposition 2 Whenever βe>e , there exists a non-autarkic steady-state, in which optimal con-
sumption equals cgt in periods of high endowment, cgt in periods of low endowment, and optimal
money holdings are 0 in high endowment periods and M in low endowment periods. Qt in turn
equals Qgt,w h e r eQM = 1
1+β [βe − e]. c and c are deﬁned as in Proposition 1. In addition, there
always exists an autarkic steady-state equilibrium, in which Qt =0and c = e, c = e for all t.
directly comparing the optimal default or non-default consumption plans starting in a low-endowment period, or by
relying on an arbitrage argument of the sort that we will use in the next section to establish more general results.
8However, when one takes into account transitional dynamics, the eﬀects of this allocation on the consumption
allocation is no longer neutral. We discuss such transitional dynamics in section 5 and provide a formal analysis in
Appendix C.
9Just think of the money stock as one-period government bonds with a zero nominal interest rate. The government
rolls over this stock of debt each period, thus keeping its supply constant. Allowing for a positive nominal interest
rate and positive money growth would not aﬀect our results, since the real interest rate would still be pinned down
in steady state.
13The steady-state consumption allocations and prices with ﬁat money are thus identical to the
ones characterized in Proposition 1. This illustrates our second result, that the set of equilibrium
allocations with self-enforcing private debt and limited market exclusion is equivalent to the set
of equilibrium allocations in the ﬁat money economy. We can therefore use equilibrium charac-
terizations that are well known for the ﬁat money environment to establish the existence of an
equilibrium with positive levels of self-enforcing private debt, as well as characterize the resulting
level of consumption-smoothing that takes place in equilibrium.
In the general stochastic environment, this equivalence result requires that the same set of state-
contingent securities is available to agents in the economy with private debt and in the economy
with unbacked public debt. This condition is met by generalizing the ﬁat money economy to an
economy with unbacked state-contingent public debt as described in Section 2.10
4M a i n R e s u l t s
In this section, we show that the results derived for our deterministic example extend to a general
environment with stochastic endowments. First, we provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for borrowing constraints to be self-enforcing, which requires that at each history agents must be
able to exactly ﬁnance their previous debt obligation by issuing new claims. We call this condition
“exact roll-over.” Then, we show that if debt limits satisfy the exact roll-over condition, equilibrium
allocations are equivalent to the ones in the economy with unbacked public debt. This result implies
that if the economy primitives are such that unbacked public debt is valued in equilibrium, then
there also exist equilibria with positive levels of self-enforcing private debt.
4.1 Self-enforcement and exact roll-over
Here, we show that debt limits are self-enforcing if and only if they allow for exact roll-over. Debt
limits are said to allow for exact roll-over, if, at each history st,a na g e n tc a nﬁnance the maximum
amount of outstanding promises, −φj ¡
st¢
, by issuing the maximum amount of new promises,
−φj ¡
st+1¢
,f o re a c hst+1 following st.












for all st ∈ S. (16)
10Moreover, if unbacked public debt and self-enforcing private debt are allowed to co-exist, the set of steady-state
allocations remains the same. We will return to this point in Section 5.
14Our ﬁrst main result is then stated as follows:
Theorem 1 The debt limits Φj : S →R are self-enforcing (SE), if and only if they also allow for
exact roll-over (ER).
Theorem 1 shows that exact roll-over is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for debt limits to be
self-enforcing. It generalizes the condition from the deterministic case, in which debt limits must




t+1. In the remainder of this
subsection, we discuss the formal steps used to establish Theorem 1, and provide a simple heuristic
explanation of the relation between self-enforcement and exact roll-over for the deterministic case.
Exact roll-over implies self-enforcement: As a ﬁrst step, Proposition 3 shows that if debt
limits satisfy exact roll-over, they are also self-enforcing.




a − φj ¡
st¢
;st¢
for all st ∈ S, for all a ≥ φj ¡
st¢
. (17)
Proof. We establish this result by comparing the set of feasible consumption plans without default
and initial asset holdings a ≥ φj ¡
st¢
and the set of feasible consumption plans with default and
initial asset holdings a − φj ¡
st¢
≥ 0, and showing that these sets are identical, for all st ∈ S,a n d
for all a ≥ φj ¡
st¢
. This then immediately implies V j(a,Φj ¡
st¢
;st)=Dj ¡

























for all st+τ Â st. Clearly, d
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st+τ¢
















st+τÂst is feasible with a default.

































































































st+τÂst,g i v e nd
¡
st¢
= a − φj ¡
st¢
, and hence the resulting consumption allocations are
identical.
Condition (17) implies the self-enforcement condition (5) by setting a = φj ¡
st¢
.I t h a s t h e
additional implication that the assumption that agents default on net asset positions and start with
an e tﬁnancial position of zero after default is not necessary for providing repayment incentives.
Condition (17) states that if a ≥ φj ¡
st¢
, an agent who defaults on his maximum gross amount
of debt
¯ ¯φj ¡
st¢¯ ¯, but keeps his own asset holdings a − φj ¡
st¢
after a default is always exactly
indiﬀerent between defaulting and not defaulting. With exact roll-over, the assumption that agents
default on net asset positions can therefore be relaxed without weakening repayment incentives.
A graphical illustration: We can illustrate this characterization of self-enforcing debt limits
and the relation to the roll-over condition with a series of ﬁgures. For this, we assume that endow-
ment ﬂuctuations are deterministic, as in the example of Section 3, and bonds are uncontingent.11







For a given sequence of prices {pt}, we can thus compare the consumption proﬁles resulting from
diﬀerent asset plans simply by comparing the period-by-period changes in the present value of
asset holdings, ptat−pt+1at+1. We use this observation to give a graphical illustration of an agent’s
incentives to default.











t , i.e., that a borrower is never allowed to borrow more than the present
11As in section 3, we replace the dependence on s
t by a time subscript to simplify notation.
16value of all his future endowments. Any sequence of debt limits that satisﬁes these assumptions
must also satisfy limt→∞ ptφ
j
t =0 .
In Figure 1 we present a graphic argument that shows that if the sequence of debt limits Φj
satisﬁes limt→∞ ptφ
j
t =0 ,a n dφj
s < 0 for some date s, then the consumer will ﬁnd it optimal to
default at some date t∗ ≥ s. Clearly, along any such sequence of debt limits ptφ
j
t must reach a
minimum at some date t, and there exists t∗, such that pt∗φ
j
t∗ < inft>t∗ ptφ
j
t, i.e., the borrower’s
debt limit is less tight in present value terms at t∗ than at any subsequent date t>t ∗.T h i s
is illustrated in Figure 1, where the thick line labelled A plots a possible path for the present
value of the borrowing limit, ptφ
j
t,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes this requirement. The thin line labelled B then
plots an arbitrary asset proﬁle that starts from at∗ = φ
j
t∗ and is consistent with this debt limit.
Now, the short-dashed line labelled C, starting from an asset position of 0 at time t∗,p l o t sa n
asset proﬁle that represents a parallel upwards shift of B.F r o m t∗ on, this proﬁle implements
exactly the same consumption sequence as B, and since it only requires positive asset positions for
all t>t ∗, it is implementable after a default. Finally, the asset proﬁle represented by the long-
dashed line labelled D is a parallel downward shift of C starting from t∗ +1 , which still maintains
non-negative asset positions in all periods. Proﬁle D thus remains feasible after a default and
implements exactly the same consumption proﬁle from date t +1on as B and C, but it delivers
strictly higher consumption in period t.H e n c eD must be preferred to both B and C.S i n c eB was
chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that any non-default asset proﬁl ec a nb es t r i c t l yi m p r o v e du p o nb y
default at time t∗.
This argument shows that a sequence of debt limits Φj that satisﬁes the two assumptions made
by BR can be self-enforcing if and only if φ
j
t =0for all t, i.e., if no lending is allowed. In fact,
if φ
j
t < 0 for some t, self-enforcement requires that limt→∞ ptφ
j
t < 0, i.e., a consumer’s debt limit
must asymptotically grow at least at the rate of interest, contradicting either BR’s assumption that
Y
j










t+1 for all t. As an equality, this condition represents the deterministic
version of the exact roll-over condition. It implies that at each date t, a consumer must be able
to exactly roll-over his maximum outstanding debt φ
j
t by issuing new claims which are valued at
(pt+1/pt)φ
j
t+1.I nF i g u r e2 ,l i n eA plots such debt limits, which are weakly expanding (and strictly
expanding at date t0). Line B then plots an asset proﬁle that is feasible for an agent who defaults at
date t∗.L i n eC represents a parallel downward shift of B, thus implementing the same consumption
proﬁle, starting from an initial asset position of φ
j
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Figure 3: Exact roll-over and the strong self-enforcement condition
A, it is feasible for an agent who does not default. Finally, proﬁle D uses the fact that the debt limit
is strictly expanding in present value terms at t0 to increase consumption in that period. D remains
feasible without a default and is strictly preferred to B and C;s i n c eB was picked arbitrarily, we
conclude that no default is always at least as good as default, and it is strictly better than default,
if Φj is strictly expanding at some subsequent date.
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the knife-edge case where Φj satisﬁes the deterministic exact roll-
over condition with equality in every period. As before, the thick line A plots the debt limit,
ptφ
j
t. B and C are two asset proﬁles which start, respectively, from asset positions of a − φ
j
t∗ ≥ 0
and a ≥ φ
j
t∗ at date t∗, and are parallel to each other; hence they lead to the same consumption
sequences. When the exact roll-over condition holds with equality, C satisﬁes the debt limit, if and
only if B is feasible after a default. Since this applies to any such pair of asset proﬁles B and C,w e
therefore conclude that the same consumption sequences can be implemented starting with assets
18a − φ
j
t∗ after a default, or starting with assets a ≥ φ
j
t∗, with no default. Therefore, the agent must












,f o ra ≥ φ
j
t and all t.
Figures 2 and 3 thus provide a graphical illustration of the strong self-enforcement condition in
Proposition 3. The roll-over condition, expressed as an inequality, is suﬃcient to deter default. If
it holds as a strict inequality for some t0 >t , then the agent is strictly better oﬀ not defaulting. If,
instead, it holds as an equality in all periods then the agents is always indiﬀerent between defaulting
and not defaulting.
Self-enforcement implies exact roll-over: To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we show
that the converse of Proposition 3 also holds.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the debt limits Φj : S →R are self-enforcing (SE). Then they allow
for exact roll-over (ER).
The proof of this proposition combines arbitrage arguments with speciﬁc properties of the
agents’ optimization problem. We present the complete proof in Appendix B; here we sketch the
main steps.
Suppose that the sequence of borrowing limits Φj : S →R is self-enforcing. Consider the problem










st+τÂst denote the resulting optimal asset proﬁle. Now, construct the sequence of









































The sequence of shadow debt limits ˜ Φj ¡
st¢
is deﬁned recursively as the sum over the continuation
histories’ shadow or actual debt limits, picking for each st+τ+1 Â st+τ the larger of the two, in
absolute value.











, then an arbitrage












, i.e., the sequence ˜ Φj ¡
st¢
provides a lower bound for Φj ¡
st¢
.
Moreover, by construction, ˜ Φj ¡
st¢




, i.e., at events
where the borrowing constraint is non-binding.






at st is the same under the original debt limits, Φj, as under the shadow debt limits, ˜ Φj ¡
st¢
.









































, the shadow debt limits ˜ Φj ¡
st¢










































for all st+τ+1 Â st+τ.A l o n g t h e s a m e










































, i.e., that the current
actual debt limit equals the shadow debt limit, and that ˜ Φj satisﬁes the exact roll-over condition
























is the set of histories st+τ Â st, at which the debt limit is binding for the ﬁrst time
after st, for an agent who starts at st with asset position φj ¡
st¢























i.e., we divide the set B
¡
st¢
at which the debt limit is binding, into immediate successors st+1 Â st,
and into histories st+τ Â st,w i t hτ>1, which are not immediate successors of st. The latter set is
then divided into subsets of histories st+τ that are each successors of the same immediate successor
20st+1 Â st.A saﬁnal step of our proof, we exploit the monotonicity properties of the optimal asset


























,i tf o l l o w st h a tΦj satisﬁes
the exact roll-over condition.
4.2 Allocational equivalence
We now turn to the question whether there exist equilibria with positive levels of self-enforcing debt,
and how they can be characterized. We answer this question in Theorem 2, which states that a given
consumption allocation and price vector constitute a competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing
private debt, if and only if the same allocation and prices are an equilibrium of the correspond-
ing economy with unbacked public debt. For the latter economy, there are known existence and
characterization results (e.g. Santos and Woodford 1997), which then extend immediately to the
economy with self-enforcing private debt.
Theorem 2 (i) If {Cj,a j,Φj;p}j=1,...,J is a non-autarkic competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing
private debt, then {Cj,ˆ aj,d j ¡
s0¢
;D,p}j=1,...,J is a non-autarkic competitive equilibrium with un-


















st¢¯ ¯ for all st ∈ S.
(ii) If {Cj,ˆ aj,d j ¡
s0¢
;D,p}j=1,...,J i san o n - a u t a r k i cc o m p e t i t i v ee q u i l i b r i u mw i t hu n b a c k e dp u b -
lic debt, then {Cj,˜ aj, ˜ Φj;p}j=1,...,J is a non-autarkic competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing















for all j, st ∈ S.
Proof. (i) Fix a price sequence p, and suppose that Φj satisﬁes exact roll-over. Then, for j =
1,...,J, Proposition 3 implies V j(a,Φj;s0)=Dj ¡
a − φj ¡
s0¢
;s0¢
, for all a ≥ φj ¡
s0¢
. Therefore,
since {Cj,a j} solves (P1) for given debt limits Φj, prices p and zero initial asset holdings, {Cj,ˆ aj}
solves (P1), given zero debt limits, prices p, and initial asset holdings of dj ¡
s0¢
= a − φj ¡
s0¢
.
But then, for given prices p, {Cj,ˆ aj} are optimal allocations in the economy with unbacked public
debt given initial asset holdings dj ¡
s0¢
. Next, notice that if Φj allows for exact roll-over for all







st¢¯ ¯ satisﬁes the government budget constraint (6), for all st ∈ S.
Finally, to show that {Cj,ˆ aj} clears markets in the public debt economy, notice that asset market




















st¢¯ ¯ = d
¡
st¢
,s o{ˆ aj} clears asset markets
21in the public debt economy. Good markets clearing is immediate, since market clearing condition








for all st ∈ S,i nb o t he n v i r o n m e n t s .
(ii) First, notice that if d
¡
st¢
satisﬁes (6), for all st ∈ S, then the sequence of debt limits ˜ Φj
as constructed above allows for exact roll-over, for all j. Now, reversing the above argument, if
{Cj,ˆ aj} is optimal in the public debt economy, given initial debt holdings of dj ¡
s0¢
,t h e n{Cj,˜ aj}
is optimal in the private debt economy, given borrowing limits ˜ Φj and zero initial asset holdings.
Finally, asset market clearing implies that for all st ∈ S,
PJ





















j=1 ˜ aj ¡
st¢
=0 , which implies that {Cj,˜ aj} also clears asset markets
in the private debt economy. That {Cj,˜ aj} also clears goods markets is then immediate.
Theorem 2 determines a mapping between the initial borrowing limits in the private debt
economy and the initial holdings of public debt in the public debt economy. It also determines a
mapping, for each st, between the aggregate private debt in circulation in the ﬁrst economy and
the aggregate public debt in circulation in the second. Once the initial borrowing limits and asset
positions are aligned and the dynamics of aggregate debt are the same, then the same consumption
allocation and the same real rates of return emerge in the two economies.
The argument of this theorem is established in three steps. First, for a given set of bond returns,
the strong self-enforcement condition (17) in Proposition 3 implies that once each agent’s initial
debt holdings are equated to his initial private debt limit, the set of feasible consumption allocations
coincide in the public and private debt economies. A given equilibrium consumption allocation is
then optimal in both economies.













satisﬁes the government budget constraint (6). The reverse is also true: for any sequence
of public debt levels that satisfy (6), we can construct debt limits for the private debt economy,
such that initial debt limits are equated to initial public debt holdings for each type, debt limits







st¢¯ ¯ for all histories. As in the example of Section
3, these debt limits are not uniquely determined for each individual, but the aggregate private debt
in circulation is.
Finally, we check that the resulting allocations and asset holdings clear the markets in the
private debt economy, if and only if they clear markets in the economy with unbacked public








for all st ∈ S.
22The equivalence result is not restricted to steady-states, but applies to any competitive equilib-
rium. To interpret this result consider the following. If we aggregate the total debt in circulation
in the private debt economy, and use the exact roll-over condition, we see that aggregate debt
satisﬁes the same aggregate law of motion as the unbacked public debt issued by the government.
The public debt economy is an economy where the government cannot use taxation to ﬁnance the
repayment of its claims, and must instead roll them over indeﬁnitely. On the other hand, in the
private debt economy agents have extremely limited power to enforce private debt, to the extent
that agents can only issue claims that can be repaid by issuing new claims, whereas any contract
that required a net transfer of resources from some date forward would not be sustainable. The
lack of taxation power on the government side matches exactly the lack of commitment on the
agents’ side. The equivalence thus arises when both the public sector and the private sector have
very limited power to collect payments from market participants.
We conclude this section with a brief comment about the preference assumptions. Time-additive
separability, strict concavity and boundedness of the life-time utility function enter only in Proposi-
tion 4. Since Proposition 3 and Theorem 2 relied purely on arbitrage arguments, they only require
strict monotonicity of U w.r.t. C, and therefore hold much more generally, if (for Theorem 2) one
restricts attention to debt limits that allow for exact roll-over as one particular class of equilibria
with self-enforcing private debt.
5E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we discuss some extensions of the results derived and some related applications in
the context of monetary models and in international ﬁnance.
Out-of-steady-state dynamics: As noticed above, Theorem 2 applies to all equilibria, not
only to steady-states. To elaborate on that observation, one can go back to the example in Section
3 and look at (i) transitional dynamics and (ii) non-stationary equilibria.
In an economy with ﬁat money, it is well known that the initial allocation of ﬁat money across
agents will determine the transition to steady-state consumption allocations. Theorem 2 implies
that, in the same way, the initial borrowing limits will determine the transition to steady-state in
the private debt economy. The analysis in Appendix C derives explicitly the transition path for the
model of Section 3, and shows the mapping between the private debt and the ﬁat money economy.
Likewise, it is well known that in models with ﬁat money there are non-stationary equilibria
with hyperinﬂation, where the real value of money collapses over time. By Theorem 2, there must
23also exist equilibria of the private debt economy with similar features, i.e., non-stationary equilibria
in which the real value of private debt is collapsing over time. In Appendix C we analyze these
equilibria formally. The logic of these equilibria is the following: if agents anticipate that there will
be a tightening of borrowing constraints in the future, this reduces repayment incentives today.
This means that there are equilibrium sequences of debt limits that go to zero over time, with the
equilibrium allocation converging to autarky.
Co-existence of public and private debt and implications for monetary theory: It
is straightforward to extend our model to allow for the co-existence of unbacked public debt and
self-enforcing private debt. This does not change the set of equilibrium consumption allocations
but introduces a source of indeterminacy regarding the real value of public and private debt in
circulation. If we go back to the example of Section 3, it is possible to show that the same steady
state allocation described in Propositions 1 and 2 can be supported in an equilibrium where money
and private debt co-exist. In this equilibrium the price of money Q and the debt limits φo,φ e must
satisfy:




If both are positively valued, they must be perfect substitutes, and their rates of return must be
identical. This is reminiscent of the indeterminacy result of Kareken and Wallace (1981) regarding
the co-existence of multiple ﬁat currencies.
In the absence of aggregate shocks, unbacked public debt may be interpreted as ﬁat money, while
self-enforcing private debt may be interpreted as a form of inside money, such as bank deposits.
Within our environment, one is sustainable if and only if the other is, and they lead to identical real
allocations. When both are available, this merely leads to a further indeterminacy in how much
each is used in transactions. We view this as a useful benchmark result. The existing monetary
literature discusses the circulation of ﬁat and inside money largely in separation from each other.
The circulation of ﬁat money requires that an intrinsically useless asset is traded at a positive
price, which connects the analysis to the possibility of rational bubbles. The circulation of inside
money (demandable debt) instead relies on having the proper reputational mechanisms in place
to guarantee that outstanding claims are honored; for this, the Bulow-Rogoﬀ puzzle is directly
relevant. Although on the surface these seem distinct conceptual problems, our analysis shows that
the sustainability of ﬁat and inside money are actually closely related.12
12See Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1999) and Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005) for matching models of
private debt circulation under limited commitment. Cavalcanti et al. study a monetary matching model, in which a
ﬁxed subset of agents is allowed to issue notes, which are sustained by the loss of a non-competitive note-issuing rent
24The case where both public and private debt co-exist can also be used to clarify the informational
and enforcement frictions under which the BR assumption that agents after a default are only
denied credit, but cannot be prevented from savings emerges as the equilibrium punishment. This
assumption requires the public monitoring of negative asset holdings, to enforce the borrowing
limits, but, at the same time, this assumption rules out the monitoring and conﬁscation of positive
asset holdings after the default episode. This assumption arises if some debt contracts take the
form of bearer bonds, i.e., bonds whose ownership is not monitored. This is a particularly natural
assumption for government-issued ﬁat money. In an environment with government-issued ﬁat
money, the BR assumption then emerges naturally as the strongest possible punishment, since after
a default, agents are able to use ﬁat money anonymously for savings, even if they are completely
excluded from private debt transactions.
Sovereign debt and international capital ﬂows: The original motivation of Bulow and
Rogoﬀ’s was to study the sustainability of sovereign debt by reputation. Our analysis suggests
that such debt may indeed be sustainable, provided that prices and debt ceilings adjust accord-
ingly. Whereas much of the existing literature following BR has treated the no-lending result as a
theoretical puzzle, our results suggest that debt sustainability should ﬁrst be addressed as a quan-
titative question. In particular, the relevant issue is to examine whether or not debt limits and
international rates of return are consistent with repayment incentives. A quantitative evaluation
of this issue would require us to enrich our model to allow for a number of features of actual inter-
national capital ﬂows, in particular the presence of gross positions on diﬀerent types of public and
private instruments. This evaluation is outside the scope of this paper. However, several observers
have recently noticed that the largest world debtor, the US, does indeed pay a low rate of return
on its external liabilities.13 Under our approach, this low rate of return provides the US with a
broad form of “seignorage,” reﬂected in the fact that a positive ﬁnancial ﬂow is associated to the
net debtor position. The threat of losing this seignorage provides a simple discipline device that
gives the proper incentives to the sovereign debt issuer.14
if outstanding notes are not redeemed on demand. Related to our results, Berentsen et al. study a matching model
with money and competitive supply of bank credit, and show among other things that with lack of commitment, such
credit is sustainable only if the inﬂation rate is non-negative.
13See e.g. Gourinchas and Rey (2005).
14This net ﬂow of resources is due to (1) the fact that the debt of the US grows over time, and (2) the fact that
the US receives a higher return on its gross asset positions than what it pays on his gross liabilities. To capture the
second element would require a model with an explicit treatment of gross ﬁnancial positions.
25Our theoretical analysis is related also to the model of private international capital ﬂows ana-
lyzed by Jeske (2006) and Wright (2006). In their model, individuals can borrow either with full
commitment in a domestic capital market, or with limited commitment in an international mar-
ket; after a default on a borrower’s outstanding international debt, the borrower is excluded from
the international, but not the domestic capital market. With perfect domestic commitment, all
agents in a country are either simultaneously constrained or unconstrained in international markets
(otherwise the unconstrained agents could proﬁtably intermediate the constrained agents’ access to
international markets), and if the country is unconstrained, domestic rates of return are the same
as international rates of return. Therefore, with perfect access to domestic credit markets, agents
are able to save at international rates of return, with these savings being intermediated by the
agents’ compatriots, but they lose access to credit at international rates and they actually prefer
not to borrow at the domestic rates. The allocations that can be supported by private international
capital ﬂows then replicate exactly the general equilibrium allocations of our Bulow-Rogoﬀ econ-
omy, and our equivalence with rational bubbles can also be used to show existence and characterize
equilibria in the Jeske-Wright model.15
Other extensions: Our analysis has focused on an endowment economy. Extending our results
to the case of production economies presents a number of challanges, which are well known from the
literature on rational bubbles. Namely, allowing for capital accumulation restricts the sustainability
of rational bubbles, or of positively priced ﬁat money, if capital is freely tradeable. Generalizing
our equivalance result to production economies with capital accumulation then implies that these
same factors also restrict the sustainability of private debt. One way around this problem is to
assume that capital accumulation and capital transfers are subject to real or ﬁnancial frictions.
This avenue is pursued, for example, in Woodford (1990) and Ventura (2004), who show that if the
ﬁnancial friction is suﬃently strong, bubbles can still arise in equilibrium.
It may also be interesting to explore.the implications of our model for income and consumption
inequality and risk-sharing. Krueger and Perri (2006), for example, ask whether a limited com-
mitment model can account for the trends of increasing income and consumption inequality over
the last 25 years. A key insight from their analysis is that an increase in income volatility may
generate only a much smaller increase, or possibly a decrease, in consumption inequality, because
the increasing income volatility makes a default less appealing, which improves the opportunities
for risk-sharing. The magnitude of this eﬀect depends primarily on the extent to which agents can
smooth consumption after a default, and it may therefore be worthwhile to study the risk-sharing
15See Wright (2006), Section 5, for a formal discussion.
26implications of alternative consequences of default.
To account for consumption and income volatility and risk sharing, it may also be useful to
extend our model to allow for unobserved idiosyncratic shocks and incomplete markets. This
extension is important also from a theoretical perspective: early versions of the Bewley-style ﬁat
money model assume explicitly that agents face unobserved idiosyncratic endowment shocks. A
generalization of our results to incomplete market economies would then further reinforce the
equivalence between self-enforcing private and unbacked public securities.16
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have studied a general equilibrium economy with self-enforcing private debt, in
which, after a default, borrowers are excluded from future credit, but retain the ability to save
in the market. For a partial equilibrium version of this model, in which a small open economy
borrows internationally at ﬁxed, positive interest rates, Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989a) have shown that
debt cannot be sustainable by reputational mechanisms only: eventually, the country always has
an incentive to default. In contrast, we show that positive levels of debt can be sustained in general
equilibrium. The key to our result is that interest rates adjust downwards to provide the right
repayment incentives.
More generally, we have established two results. First, we show that with future exclusion from
credit as the only consequence fo default, debt limits are self-enforcing i fa n do n l yi ft h e ya l l o w
agents to exactly honor their outstanding payment obligations by issuing new debt (exact roll-over).
Second, if debt limits satisfy exact roll-over, the resulting equilibrium allocations are equilibrium
allocations of an economy, in which a government issues unbacked public securities and rolls them
over period by period. For the latter environment, there exist well known existence results for
non-autarkic equilibria with positive levels of debt.
We believe that our characterization results may be useful for a variety of applications. In the
context of sovereign debt, to which this model was originally applied, our analysis suggests that the
sustainability of debt should be viewed not so much as a theoretical puzzle, but as a quantitative
issue. We leave an exploration of these and other applications to future work.
16One complication of such a generalization is the possibility that agents may actually use default explicitly to
obtain better insurance against idiosyncratic risk; i.e to “complete the market”, in a sense.
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7 Appendix A: Proofs

























t+1, and the transversality






t+1 =0 . We check that our proposed solution satisﬁes these conditions for




t in a high endowment period.














































for each τ =2· k.
Substituting y
j
t = egt and y
j
t+1 = egt+1, our conjectures for bond prices qt = qj, qt+1 = q−j,
debt limits φ
j
t = φjgt and φ
j
t+2 = φjgt+2, consumption proﬁles c
j
t = cjgt and c
j
t+1 = cjgt+1,a n d
asset holdings a
j
t+1 = ajgt+1,w ec a ns o l v et h eﬁrst three conditions for cj, cj and aj and ﬁnd (7)-(9)
as a solution. Since
cj
cj = gq−j/β and q−j,q j ≥ β/g, we obtain the following chain of inequalities
cj
cj
= β/(gq−j) ≤ 1 ≤ gqj/β,









cjg max{a,φ},s ot h e




t+1 is satisﬁed by
hypothesis.
Proof of Lemma 2. We again check that the proposed allocation satisﬁes the consumer’s ﬂow
budget constraints, the Euler equations and the transversality condition, starting from a period t
with high endowments, in which a
j
t =0 . This is immediate, since the problem is the same as that
in Lemma 1, after setting φj =0 . In this case, we can check that the condition ad
j ≥ 0 always
holds, because βe ≥ qjge follows from the fact that e ≥ e and qj ≤ β/g.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Apart from the autarkic case, the proof is in the text. Suppose that
φo = φe =0 . Then, market clearing requires that a
j
t =0for all j, t. Given our solution to (P2),
it is easy to check that a
j
t =0for all t i so p t i m a li fa n do n l yi fβe ≤ (qjg)e. Thus, whenever
(qjg) ≥
βe
e for j ∈ {o,e}, the autarkic allocation is indeed optimal, and the bond market clears
without any trade actually occuring.





s.t. ct ≤ y
j
t + Qt (Mt − Mt+1)
Mt+1 ≥ 0
31Deﬁning at = QtMt and qt = Qt/Qt+1, this problem is identical to (P1), with zero debt limits and
initial asset holdings of a0 = Q0M0. Therefore, conjecturing that qt = q is constant in steady-state,
the optimal steady-state allocations are characterized from Lemma 1, as cgt in high endowment























Thus, markets clear if and only if qg =1 , which corresponds to the non-autarkic equilibrium.




t for all t, j.
8 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
Here, we discuss the proof of Proposition 4. Since this result is signiﬁcantly more involved than
the others, we discuss its proof separately from the other results, and have divided it into seven
lemmas. Lemma 3 establishes useful properties of the solution to the household problem (P1).
Lemmas 4-7 then establish the existence and characterization of the shadow debt limits ˜ Φ.L e m m a
8 establishes the exact roll-over condition for ˜ Φ, and Lemma 9 uses this to show that ER also holds













for all st ∈ S.I f φ
¡
st¢
=0for all st ∈ S,t h e
proposition holds trivially. Suppose therefore that φ
¡
st¢









st+τ∈S(st)∪{st} the associated optimal consumption pro-
ﬁle, starting from asset holdings of φ
¡
st¢
at history st. Lemma 3 establishes some useful properties






























































32Proof. Part (i) follows immediately from the properties of problem (P1). To characterize a notice


















































































































































































































are, respectively, the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint at st



































. The budget constaint can




























Since u is concave in c and V is concave in a, γ (·) and ψ
¡
·;st+1¢
are decreasing in λ, and therefore
there exists a unique value of λ
¡
a;st¢
















. But then, the proposition follows immediately.



























































denotes the set of histories st+τ along which the debt limit was never binding between event
st and st+τ,a n dN
¡
st¢
the union of all such sets. Bτ
¡
st¢
denotes the set of histories st+τ at which
the debt limit is binding for the ﬁr s tt i m ea f t e rst,a n dB
¡
st¢
the union of all such sets. If the debt













































It is immediate to check that a solution ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
to (19) exists, if ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
is allowed to take on










otherwise. We complete this in four steps, that are formulated by the next four lemmas. The






. The fourth lemma extends this




















































































































































































































































For the RHS, the agents’ transversality condition implies that


























































35But then, it follows immediately that Y
¡
st+τ¢
< ∞ and ˆ φ
¡
st+τ¢
> −∞. Moreover, by Lemma 3













≥ 0 for all st ∈ S. Summing this inequality
























































































































































































































,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes equation (19).





















































=0is established from the household’s transver-













≥ 0, and using the same argument as in the preceding lemma.
Our next lemma shows that the auxiliary debt limits ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
provide a lower bound for the
actual sequence of debt limits Φ
¡
st¢






for all st+τ,a n dt h a t˜ φ
¡
st+τ¢
(or equivalently ˆ φ
¡
st+τ¢





































































st+τ+k∈S(st)∪{st} the corresponding consumption proﬁle.
















































st+τ+k∈S(st)∪{st} be the corresponding consumption proﬁle. Clearly, this asset
proﬁle is feasible; we show that this proﬁle also leads to strictly higher utility, and hence default




























































































=0after a default, which yields a life-time
expected discounted utility of D
¡
0;st+τ+k¢

































































































































Part (ii) then follows immediately from the deﬁnition of ˜ φ
¡
st+τ¢



























Our next lemma extends the existence and characterization of ˜ Φ
¡
st¢







Moreover, it shows that this solution must establish a version of the roll-over property as a weak
inequality, i.e., if the borrowing constraints were given by ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
, an agent would always be able
to roll over existing claims by issuing new claims, without necessarily always exhausting his debt
limits.






















































is the subset of histories in S
¡
st¢



























with asset position φ
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st+τ¢
.S i n c eo u ra n a l y s i s





to construct a solution ˜ Φ
¡
st¢


















,t h es a m e













, a default is strictly better than no default.









. For any st ∈ S, φ
¡
st¢
must be equal to
the sum of the present discounted values of the debt limits at all events st+τ ∈ B
¡
st¢
,w h e r et h e
debt limit is binding for the ﬁrst time after st. This also implies that ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
must satisfy (ER) with





























characterized by Lemmas (5)-(7). Consider the problem (P1), but with the borrowing constraints
equal to ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
















































st+τÂst also satisﬁes the optimality conditions
for the relaxed problem with borrowing constraints ˜ Φ
¡
st¢


















































































































































for some st+τ ∈ S
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denotes the set of histories st+τ, at which the borrowing constraint is binding for the ﬁrst
time for an agent who starts from an asset position of φ
¡
st+1¢






is the set of histories st+τ, at which the borrowing constraint is binding for the ﬁrst time for an




















































into a sequence {s(k)}
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as follows: Let s(k) denote the k-th history in our ordering

































, we check whether it is in Mk−1
¡
st+1¢
, and if it is,
we eliminate it, and replace it with the set of events B(s(k)) at which the debt limit is binding for









.M o r e o v e r ,
40since from the previous lemma, p(s(k))φ(s(k)) =
P






















which completes the proof.
Remark: None of the preceding arguments rely on B
¡
st¢


























. Therefore, if φ
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non-empty, and that there exists a history st+τ ∈ B
¡
st¢




9 Appendix C: Extensions




1+β [βe − e], so that there exists a steady-state with positive levels of debt. The
transition to steady-state is complete after one period and qt =1for t ≥ 1, optimal consumption
allocations are given by the steady-state allocations c = 1
1+β [e + e] and c =
β
1+β [e + e] starting
from period 1.I n p e r i o d 0, the even agent’s optimal consumption is determined by the initial
borrowing constraint, and is equal to ce
0 = e + q0φe
1. Odd types are unconstrained, and hence co
0
and ao
1 are determined from the Euler equation in period 0,
co

















condition in period 0 then requires co
0+ce
0 = e+e. Substituting, we ﬁnd q0 [e + φo
1 +( 1+β)φe
1]=βe,
or, after using the fact that φo
1 + φe
1 = 1









1+β [βe − e], it is easy to check that
ce
0 = e + q0φe





1+β (e + e)
≤ e +
e 1
1+β [βe − e]
1
1+β [βe − e]+ 1










41so that the even agent’s Euler equation in the initial period is also satisﬁed.
Therefore, the lower is the borrowing capacity of the even agent who initially has low endow-
ments, the higher is the ﬁrst-period bond price, the lower is the period 0 consumption by even




1+β [βe − e], i.e., even agents are unable to undertake any borrowing, in which case the pe-
riod zero consumption is equal to the endowment. At the other extreme, φe
1 = 1
1+β [βe − e] and
φo
1 =0 . In that case, all the borrowing is undertaken by the even agents, q0 =1 ,a n dﬁrst period
consumption allocations jump immediately to the steady-state.
Private Debt Collapses: We return to the example of Section 3, and set g =1 ,f o rs i m p l i c i t y .


















t+2. Given a sequence of bond prices {qt}
∞
t=0, optimal consumption allocations






,w h e r ect and ct+1 denote consumption in period t and
t+1, respectively, for an agent who has high endowment in period t a n dl o we n d o w m e n ti np e r i o d
t+1,a n da
j
t+1 denotes this agent’s asset holdings in period t+1. These must satisfy the ﬁrst-order



























[e + qte] and ct+1 =
β






qt (1 + β)
[e − (qt/β)e] − φ
j
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,w et h e nh a v e
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Figure 4: Private Debt Collapses
Finally, notice that for all qt ∈ [1,βe/e], βe/e >q t+2 >q t+1 >q t, and hence 1/ct+2 ≤ 1/ct =
(β/qt)/ct+1 ≤ 1/ct+1.T h u s ,f o rqt ∈ [1,βe/e], the Euler Equations are also satisﬁed as an inequality
when agents are borrowing constrained.
Condition (20) characterizes equilibrium dynamics and is plotted in ﬁgure 4. There exist two
stationary equilibria. In the ﬁrst one, qt =1 ,f o ra l lt, which corresponds to the steady-state with
positive levels of debt as characterized in Proposition 2. In the other one, qt =
eβ
e > 1,b o r r o w i n g
constraints are equal to zero, and agents are in autarky. Finally, for intermediate initial levels
of borrowing, there exist transition paths, in which there is a self-fulﬁlling collapse of the real
amount of debt in circulation: qt initially is larger than 1, and keeps increasing over time, while
the borrowing constraints φ
j
t collapse to zero. In the limit, consumption allocations approach the
endowments, i.e., there is convergence to autarky. Moreover, these transition paths to autarky may
start arbitrarily closely to the steady-state with positive levels of debt.
Coexistence of Private and Public Debt: It is possible also to allow for the coexistence of
self-enforcing private debt and unbacked public debt. If both types of securities are in circulation,
one can immediately establish the existence of equilibria in which only one form of debt is positively
valued, and either private debt limits are all equal to zero (replicating the equilibrium with only
public debt), or the real value of the public debt in circulation is zero (replicating the equilibrium
with only private debt).
The question then arises whether there can be equilibria in which both types of securities are
positively valued, and what allocations can be sustained this way. For this, we notice ﬁrst that
in such an equilibrium, both types of securities must be perfect substitutes, and hence oﬀer the
43same real returns. We can therefore redeﬁne an agent’s net ﬁnancial position aj ¡
st¢
as the sum of
the net holdings of private debt claims, and the holdings of unbacked public debt. As before, the
net ﬁnancial position is bounded below by the debt limit, φj ¡
st¢
, which must be self-enforcing. In
addition, the total amount of public debt in circulation still has to satisfy the government roll-over
condition, and markets must clear, i.e., the agents’ net ﬁnancial positions add up to the government
debt in circulation. This leads to the following equilibrium deﬁnition:













solve the consumer’s problem (P1),
(ii) the borrowing constraints Φj are self-enforcing,
( i i i )t h ep u b l i cd e b ts e q u e n c eD satisﬁes (6), and















for st+1 Â st,f o r
all j and all st ∈ S.
We then get the following generalization of Theorem 2:
Proposition 5 (i) If {Cj,a j,Φj,d j ¡
s0¢
;D,p}j=1,...,J is a non-autarkic competitive equilibrium
with self-enforcing private and unbacked public debt, then {Cj,ˆ aj, ˆ dj ¡
s0¢
; ˆ D,p}j=1,...,J is a non-























st¢¯ ¯ for all st ∈ S.
(ii) If {Cj,ˆ aj,d j ¡
s0¢
;D,p}j=1,...,J i san o n - a u t a r k i cc o m p e t i t i v ee q u i l i b r i u mw i t hu n b a c k e dp u b -
lic debt, then {Cj,˜ aj, ˜ Φj, ˜ dj ¡
s0¢
; ˜ D,p}j=1,...,J, is a non-autarkic competitive equilibrium with self-


























for all st ∈ S,
for any k ∈ [0,1].
Proof. (i) Self-enforcement still requires that Φj satisﬁes exact roll-over. Proposition 3 then
implies V j(a,Φj;s0)=Dj ¡
a − φj ¡
s0¢
;s0¢
, for all a ≥ φj ¡
s0¢
. Therefore, since {Cj,a j} solves
(P1) for given debt limits Φj, prices p and initial asset holdings of dj ¡
s0¢
, {Cj,ˆ aj} solves (P1),

















st¢¯ ¯ satisﬁes the
government budget constraint (6), for all st ∈ S. Finally, to show that {Cj,ˆ aj} clears markets in































satisﬁes (6), for all st ∈ S, then the sequence of debt limits ˜ Φj allows for exact
roll-over, for all j,a n da n yk ∈ [0,1] Now, if {Cj,ˆ aj} is optimal in the public debt economy, given
initial debt holdings of dj ¡
s0¢
,t h e n{Cj,˜ aj} is optimal in the economy with public and private debt,
given borrowing limits ˜ Φj and initial asset holdings of ˜ dj ¡
s0¢
. Finally, asset market clearing implies
that for all st ∈ S,
PJ





























, which implies that {Cj,˜ aj} also clears asset markets in the private debt
economy.
45